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Abstract
This paper we define a new Puzzle called Proof-of-Interaction and
we show how it can replace, in the Bitcoin protocol, the Proof-of-Work
algorithm.
1 Introduction
A Blockchain is a data-structure where data can only be appended in blocks. It
is maintained in a distributed manner by many participants, who may not trust
each-other, and some of which can be faulty or malicious. In order for this data
structure to be consistent among the participants, a protocol is used to ensure
that every one agrees on the next block that is appended into the Blockchain.
The most famous example of such protocol, Bitcoin [13], uses the Proof-of-
Work to elect a single participant that is responsible for appending the next
block. However, the Proof-of-Work mechanism consumes a lots of computational
power [14]. There have been many attempts to avoid using Proof-of-work based
agreement, but each one of them adds other constraints (eg., small number of
nodes, hardware prerequisite, new security threat).
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a better
alternative to PoW, called Proof-of-Interaction, which requires negligible com-
putational power. Second, we show how it can be used to create an efficient
Blockchain protocol that is resilient against selfish mining, but assumes for now
a fixed size network.
The intuition behind our protocol is the following. If we want to avoid doing
unnecessary work, we have to ask the expert in this domain: the officials working
in French administrations. Our protocol is based on the trivial observation,
that any one can relate to, that the French administration is a very complex
system, that is unpredictable, slow, and executed by nodes with very small
computational power.
∗This paper has been submitted to FUN with algorithms conference, with a different title.
This is why the introduction may look a little bit informal.
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Here is a very realistic example of what could happen when a user interacts
with the French administration. Assume, for instance, that a user wants to pay
his taxes. He contacts a service S1, but is usually forwarded to another service
S2 to retrieve a document D1 needed to answer the request. After contacting
service S2, the answer will be first to get a specific form from a service S3 and
to ask service S4 to sign it, so that he could get document D1. However, the
service S3 does not exist anymore, since the last restructuring (S2 was not aware
of that), so S4 is contacted without the necessary form and our user actually
learns that the whole procedure has changed, because he is now in a specific
regime (he is most likely from Strasbourg, where the French laws do not entirely
apply). So document D2, from service S5, is needed instead of D1. After a long
time, the probability that our user successfully completes his task is very low
(he may just stop and wait for the debt recovery to proceed). Interestingly,
despite the long time needed to complete the task, no work has been done.
This idea is well illustrated in the French cartoon movie “The Twelve Tasks
of Asterix” where Asterix interacts with the Gaulic Administration1. Even
though the procedure might be very slow and tedious, the verification is very
fast. Indeed, the French debt recovery service can detect quickly any deviation
from the standard procedure.
The goal is to use this method to elect a node in the network, in the same way
Proof-of-work does. The main idea to understand how the Proof-of-Interaction
can be used in a Blockchain context is the following. If a set of users is asked
to interact with the French Administration, the first one to complete his task is
elected to append a block in the Blockchain. This paper handles the case where
all the participants are known, and we discuss at the end how this assumption
could be weakened in future work.
Related Work Proof-of-work [3] (PoW) is a method initially intended for
preventing spamming attacks. It was then used in the Bitcoin protocol [13] as a
way to prove that a certain amount of time has passed between two consecutive
blocks. Another way to see the aim of the Proof-of-work in the Bitcoin protocol
is as a leader election mechanism, to select who is responsible for writing the next
block in the blockchain. This leader election has several important properties,
including protection against Sybil attacks [6] and against denial-of-service [12].
Also, it has a small communication complexity. However, the computational
race consumes a lot of energy [14], that some people might consider wasted (the
meaning of life and of the universe is outside the scope of this paper).
In 2012, S. King and S. Nadal [10] proposed the Proof-of-Stake (PoS), an al-
ternative for PoW. This leader election mechanism requires less computational
power but has security issues [8] (eg., Long range attack and DoS). Intel pro-
posed another alternative to PoW, the Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET) [1]. This
solution requires Intel SGX as a trusted execution environment. Thus, Intel be-
comes a required trusted party to make the consensus work, which might imply
security concerns [5] and is against blockchain idea to remove third parties.
The previous paper most related to our work was presented just prior the
presentation of Bitcoin in 2008, by M. Abliz and T. Znati [2]. They proposed
A Guided Tour Puzzle for Denial of Service Prevention, which is another spam
protection algorithm. This mechanism has not yet been used in the Blockchain
1In french : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2su7cbl-pY
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context, and is at the core of our new Proof-of-Interaction. The idea was that,
when a user wants to access a resource in a server that is heavily requested, the
server can ask the user to perform a tour of a given length in the network. This
tour consists of accessing randomly a list of nodes, own by the same provider as
the server. After the tour, a user can prove to the server that it has completed
the task and can then retrieve the resource. The way we generate our tour in the
French administration is based on the same idea. We generalized the approach
of M. Abliz and T. Znati to work with multiple participants, and we made the
tour length variable.
Model The network, is a set N of n nodes that are completely connected.
Each node has a pair of private and public cryptographic keys. Nodes are
uniquely identified by their public keys (i.e., the association between the public
keys and the nodes is common knowledge). Each message is signed by its sender,
and a node cannot fake a message signed by another (non-faulty) node.
We denote by signu(m) the signature by node u of the message m, and
verifu(s,m) the predicate that is true if and only if s = signu(m). For now,
we assume the signature algorithm is a deterministic one-way function that
depends only on the message m and on the private key of u. This assumption
might be very strong as, with common signature schemes, different signature
could be generated for the same message, but there are ways to remove this
assumption by using complex secret generation and disclosure schemes, not
discussed in this paper, so that each signature is in fact a deterministic one-way
function. The function H is a cryptographic, one-way and collision resistant,
hash function [15].
As for the Bitcoin protocol, we assume the communication is partially syn-
chronous i.e., there is a fixed, but unknown, upper bound ∆ on the time for
messages to be delivered.
The size of a set S is denoted with |S|.
Naive Approach We give here a naive approach on how asking participants
to perform a tour in the network can be used as a leader election mechanism to
elect the node responsible for appending the next block in a Blockchain.
When a node u0 wants to append a block to the blockchain, he performs
a random tour of length L in the network retrieving signatures of each par-
ticipants he visits. The first node u1 to visit is the hash of the last block
h0 = last block hash of the blockchain modulo n (if we order nodes by their
public keys, the node to visit is the i-th with i = h0 mod n). u1 responds
with the signature s1 of h0. The hash h1 = H(s1), modulo n, gives the second
node u2 to visit, and so on. This idea proposed by M. Abliz and T. Znati [2]
is interesting because the whole tour depends only on the initial value, here
the hash of the last block2. Given h0, any one can verify that the sequence of
signatures (s1, s2, . . . , sL) is a proof that the tour has been properly performed.
If each node in the network performs a tour, the first node to complete its tour
broadcast its block to the other nodes to announce it.
However, here, each node has to perform the same tour, which could be
problematic. An easy fix is to select the first node to visit, not directly using
the hash of the last block, but based on the signature of the node initiating
the tour, h0 = H(signu0(last block hash)). Now, given h0, the sequence of
signatures (signu0(h0), s1, s2, . . . , sL) proves that the tour has been properly
2in the original article [2], the initial value was a random value signed by the server
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performed by node u0. Each tour, performed by a given node, is unique, and a
node cannot compute the sequence of signature other than by actually asking
each node in the tour to sign a message. Indeed, the next hop of the tour
depends on the current one.
Here, one can see that it could be a good idea to also make the tour dependent
on the content of the block node u0 is trying to append. Indeed, using only the
last block to generate a new proof does not protect the content of the current
block, i.e., the same proof can be used to create two different blocks. To prevent
this behavior, we can assume that h0 = H(signu0(last block hash)·M) (· being
the concatenation operator) where M is a hash of the content of the block node
u0 is trying to append. In practice, it is the root of the Merkel tree containing
all the transactions of the block. Here, the proof is dependent on the content of
the block, which means that if the content of the block changes the whole proof
needs to be computed again.
From there, we face another issue. Each node performs a tour of length L, so
each participant will be elected roughly at the same time, creating a lots of forks.
To avoid this, we can make the tour length variable. We found two ways to do so.
The first one is not to decide on a length in advance, and perform the tour until
the hash of k-th signature is smaller than a given target value, representing the
difficulty of the proof. In this way, every interaction with another node during
a tour can be seen as a tentative to find a good hash (like hashing a block with
a given nonce in the PoW protocol). The target value can be selected so that
the average length of the tour is predetermined. However doing so, since the
proof does depend on the content of the block, u0 can change the content of
the block, by adding dummy transactions for instance, so that the tour stops
after one hop3. The other way to make the tour length variable is to use a
cryptographic random number generator, seeded with signu0(last block hash),
to generate the length L. Doing so, the length depends only on u0 and on the
previous block. Then a tour of length L is performed as usual.
To complete the scheme, we add other information to the message sent to
the visited node so that they can detect if we try to prove different blocks in
parallel. We also make u0 sign each response before computing the next hop,
so that the tour must pass through u0 after each visit. Finally, we will see why
it is important to perform the tour, not using the entire network, but only a
subset of it.
Paper Structure. The next section describes our final approach of the Proof-
of-Interaction, that could be used outside of the Blockchain context. Then, in
Section 3 we explain how we use this proof mechanism to create a Blockchain
protocol. Then, Section 4 shows the security properties of our protocol. Finally,
we conclude and discuss possible extensions in Section 5.
2 The Proof-of-Interaction
In this section we define the most important piece of our protocol, which is, how
a given node of the network generate a proof of interaction. Then, we will see
in the next section how this proof can be used as an election mechanism in our
Blockchain protocol.
3There are some ways to limit this attack, but we believe it will remain an important
attack vector
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Figure 1: Asterix interacts randomly
with a subset of the nodes
Figure 2: Asterix interacts with a se-
quence of nodes to construct a PoI, In
this example, the dependency is the
hash of the last block.
2.1 Algorithm Overview
We present here a couple of algorithms. One that generates a Proof-of-Interaction
(PoI), and one that checks the validity of a given PoI.
Generating a Proof-of-Interaction Consider we are a node u0 ∈ N that
wants to generate a PoI. Given a fixed dependency value denoted d, the user u0
wants to prove a message denoted m. The user has no control over d but can
chose any message to prove.
The signature by u0 of the dependency d, denoted s0 = signu0(d), is
used to generate the subset S of nS = min(20, n/2) nodes to interact with,
S = {S0, S2, . . . , SnS−1} = createServices(N , s0). S is generated using a
pseudo-random procedure, and depends only on d and on u0. From s0, we also
derive the length of the tour L = tourLength(D, s0), where D is a probabilistic
distribution that corresponds to the difficulty parameter. tourLength is a ran-
dom number generator, seeded with s0, with generating a number according to
D. Using D one can easily change the average length of the tour for instance.
Now u0 has to visit randomly L nodes in S to complete the proof, as il-
lustrated in Figure 1. To know what is the first node u1 we have to visit, we
first hash the concatenation of s0 with m to obtain h0 = H(s0 ·m). This hash
(modulo |S|) gives the index i in S of the node we have to visit, i = h0 mod |S|.
So we send the tuple (h0, d,m) to node u1 = Si, which responds by signing the
concatenation, s1 = signu1(h0 · d ·m).
To know what is the second node u2 we have to visit, we sign and hash the
response from u1 to obtain h1 = H(signu0(s1)), so that u2 = Sj ∈ S with
j = h1 mod |S|. Again, we send the tuple (h1, d,m) to u2, which responds
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by signing the concatenation, s2 = signu2(h1 · d · m). We sign and hash the
response from u1 to obtain h2 = H(signu0(s2)) and find the next node we have
to visit, and so on (see Figure 2). This continues until we compute signu0(sL),
after the response of the L-th visited node.
The Proof of Interaction (PoI) with dependency d of message m by node u0
and difficulty D is the sequence
(s0, s1, signu0(s1), s2, signu0(s2), . . . , sL, signu0(sL)).
Checking a Proof-of-Interaction To check if a PoI (s0, s1, s
′
1 . . . , sk, s
′
k)
from user u, is valid for message m, dependency d and difficulty D, one can
first check if s0 is a valid signature of d by u0. If so, then we can obtain
the set S = createServices(N , s0) of interacting nodes, the length L =
tourLength(D, s0), and the hash h0 = H(s0 · m). From h0 and S, we can
compute what is the first node u1 and check if s1 is a valid signature from u1
of (h0 · d ·m), and if s′1 is a valid signature of s1 from u0. Similarly, one can
check all the signatures until s′k. Finally, if all signatures are valid, and k = L,
the PoI is valid.
2.2 Algorithm Details
The pseudo code of our algorithms are given in the appendix.
The algorithm createServices is straightforward. We assume that we have
a random number generator (RNG) that we initialize with the given seed. The
algorithm then shuffles the input array using the given random number gener-
ator. Finally, it simply returns the first nS elements of the shuffled array.
The main part of the algorithm generatePoI consists in a loop, that per-
forms the L interactions. The algorithm requires that each node in the network
is executing the same algorithm (it can tolerates some faulty nodes, as explained
later). The end of the algorithm shows what is executed when a node receives
a message from another node. The procedure checkMessage may depends on
what the PoI is used for. In our context, the procedure checks that the nodes
that interacts with us does not try to create multiple PoI with different mes-
sages, and use the same dependency as everyone else. We will see in details in
the next section why it is important.
The algorithm checkPoI that checks the validity of a PoI is checking that
each signature from the proof is valid and respects the proof generation algo-
rithm.
Proof-of-Interactions Properties Now we explain that the Proof-of-Interaction
has the several properties that are awaited by good client-puzzle protocols [17].
Computation guarantee: The proof can only be generated by making each
visited node sign a particular message in the correct order. The sequence of
visited node depends only on the initiator node, on the dependency d, and on
the message m, and cannot be known before completing the tour. Furthermore,
a node knows the size of his tour before completing it. Which means that he
knows before doing his tour how much messages he needs to exchange and how
much signatures he will do to have a correct proof.
Non-parallelizability: A node cannot compute a valid PoI for a given depen-
dency d and message m in parallel. Indeed, In order to know what is the node
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of the i-th interaction, we need to know hi−1, hence we need to know si−1. si−1
is a signature from ui−1. So we can interact with ui only after we receive the
answer from ui−1 i.e., interactions are sequential.
Granularity: The difficulty of our protocol is easily adjustable using the pa-
rameter D. The expected time to complete the proof is 2 × mean(D) × Com
where Com is the average duration of a message transmission in the network,
and mean(D) is the mean of the distribution D.
Efficiency: Our solution is efficient in terms of computation for all the partic-
ipants. The generation of one PoI by one participant requires mean(D) hashes
and mean(D) signatures in average for the initiator of the proof, and mean(D)/n
signatures in average for another node in the network. The verification requires
2D + 1 signature verification and mean(D) hashes in average. The size of the
proof is also linear in the difficulty, as it contains 2mean(D) + 1 signatures.
3 Blockchain Consensus Using PoI
In this section we detail how we can use the PoI mechanism to build a Blockchain
protocol. The main idea is to replace, in the Bitcoin protocol, the Proof-of-work
by the Proof-of-interactions, with some adjustments. We prove in the next
section that it provides similar guarantees to the Bitcoin protocol.
Block Format First, like in the Bitcoin protocol, transactions are stored in
blocks that are chained together by including in each block, a field containing
the hash of the previous block. In Bitcoin, a block includes a nonce field so
that the hash of the block is smaller than a target value (hence proving that
computational power has been used) whereas in our protocol, the block includes
a proof of interaction where the dependency d is the hash of the previous block,
and the message m is the root of the Merkel tree storing the transactions of the
current block. Like for the transactions, the block header could contains only
the hash of the PoI, like illustrated in Figure 3 (in the appendix), and the full
proof can be stored in the block data, along with the sequence of transactions.
Block Generation How is the next block appended in the blockchain? Like
in Bitcoin, each participant has gathered a set of transactions (not necessarily
the same) and wants to append a block to the blockchain. Do to so, each one of
them tries to generate a PoI with the hash of the last block as dependency d, the
root of the Merkel tree of the transactions of their own block as message m, and
using the last block difficulty D. We assume the difficulty D is characterized
by its mean value mean(D), which is the number that is stored into the block.
Participants have no choice over d so the length of their tour, and the subset
S of potential visited node is fixed for each participants (one can assume that it
is a random subset). Each participant is trying to complete its PoI the fastest
as possible, and the first one that completes it, has a valid block. The valid
block is broadcasted into the network to announce to everyone that they now
have complete a PoI using this new block as dependency. When a node receives
a block from another node, it checks if all the transactions are valid and the
checks if the proof of interaction is valid. If so, it appends the new block to its
local blockchain and starts generating a proof of interaction based on this new
block.
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First, one can see that this could lead to forks, exactly like in the Bitcoin
protocol, where different part of the networks try to generate PoI with different
dependencies. Thus, the protocol dictates that only one of the longest chain
should be used as a dependency to generate a PoI. This is defined in the proce-
dure checkMessage. When a node receives a message from another node, it first
checks if the dependency matches the latest block of one of the longest chain.
If not, the request is ignored.
Incentives Like in Bitcoin, we give incentives to nodes that participate to the
protocol. The block reward (that could be fixed, decreasing over time, or just
contains the transactions fees) is evenly distributed among all the participants
of the PoI of the block. This implies that, to maximize their gain, nodes should
answer as fast as possible to all the requests from the other nodes currently
generating their PoI.
Also, it means that we do not want to answer a request for a node that is
not up to date i.e., that is generating a PoI for a block for which there is already
a valid block on top, or for a block in a branch that is smaller than longest one.
Preventing Double-Touring Attacks What prevents a node to try to gen-
erate several PoI using different variation of its block? If a node wants to max-
imize its gain (without even being malicious, just rational) it can add dummy
transactions to its current block to create several versions of it. Each version
can be used to initiate the generation of a PoI using different tours. However,
he has to send the message m every times he interacts with another node. If
the length of the tour is long enough, the probability that two different tours
intersect is not negligible. In other words, a node that receive two messages
from the same node, but with different values of m will raise the alarm. To
prevent double-touring, it is easy to add an incentive to discourage nodes from
generating several blocks linked to the same dependency. To do so, we assume
each participant has locked a certain amount of money in the Blockchain, and if
a node u has a proof that another node has created two different blocks with the
same dependency (i.e., previous block), then the node u can claim as reward the
locked funds of the cheating node. In addition, it can have other implications
such as the exclusion of the network. We assume that the potential loss of being
captured is greater than the gain (here the only gain would be to have a greater
probability to append its own block).
Difficulty Adjustment The difficulty could be adjusted exactly like in Bit-
coin. The goal is to chose the difficulty so that the average time B to generate
a block is fixed. Here, the difficulty parameter D gives a very precise way to
obtain a delay B between blocks and to limit the probability of fork at the same
time. If Com denotes the average duration of a transmission in the network,
then we want the expected shortest tour length among the participants to be
dB/Come.
For instance, if D is the uniform distribution between 1 and dB/Come(n +
1) − 1, then the length of the shortest tour length among all the participants
will be exactly dB/Come.
Every given period (eg., 2016 blocks as in Bitcoin), the difficulty could be
adjusted using the duration of the last period (using the timestamps included
in each block) to take into account the possible variation of Com, so that the
average time to generate a block remains B.
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Communication Complexity A quick analysis shows that each node sends
messages sequentially, one after receiving the answer of the other. At the same
time, it answers to signature requests from the other nodes. In average, a node
is part of nS tours. Hence the average number of messages per unit of time is
fixed i.e., nS + 1 every Com. Then, the total amount of messages, per unit of
time, in the whole network is linear in n.
4 Security
This section discusses about common security threats and how our PoI-based
Blockchain handles them. We assume that honest nodes will always follow our
algorithms but an attacker can have arbitrary behavior, while avoiding receiving
any penalty (which could remove him from the network). We assume that an
attacker can eavesdrop every messages exchange between two nodes but he can
not change them. Also, assume that an attacker A can not forge messages from
another honest node B.
Crash Faults A node crashes when it completely stops its execution. The
main impact is that it does not respond to the sign requests of other nodes. This
can be an issue because at each step of the PoI generation, the initiator node
could wait forever the response of a crashed node. Crashed nodes are handle by
the fact that a node only has to interact with a subset S of the whole network
N , computed using the service creation function, createServices. Hence, if a
node crashes, only a fraction of the PoI that are being generated will be stuck
waiting for it. All the nodes whose Service set S do not contains crash faults are
able to generate their PoI entirely. Since each set S is of size nS = min(n/2, 20),
we have that, if half of the nodes crash, the probability a given set S contains
a crashed node is 1 − ( 12)nS . So that the probability p that at least one set S
contains only correct nodes is
p = 1−
(
1−
(
1
2
)nS)n
One can see that the probability p tends quickly (exponentially fast) to 1 as
n tends to infinity. For small values of n, the probability is greater than a
fixed non-null value. In the rare event that all the sets S contain at least a
crashed node, then the protocol is stuck until some crashed nodes reboot and
are accessible again.
Finally, we recall that honest nodes are incentivized to answer, because they
get a reward when they are included in the next block’s PoI. Hence, honest
nodes will try be back again as fast as possible.
Selfish mining Selfish mining [7] is an attack where a set of malicious nodes
collude to waste honest nodes resources and get more reward. It works as
follow. Once a malicious node finds a new block, he only shares it with the
other malicious nodes. All malicious nodes will be working on a private chain
without revealing their new block, so that honest nodes are working on a smaller
public branch i.e., honest nodes are wasting resources to find blocks on a useless
branch. When honest nodes find a block, the malicious nodes might reveal some
of it private blocks to discard honest blocks and get the rewards.
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In Bitcoin, selfish mining is a real concern as attackers having any fraction
of the whole computational power could successfully use this strategy [16].
Interestingly, our PoI-based Blockchain is less sensible to such attacks. Our
algorithm gives a protection by design. Indeed, when generating a PoI, a node
has to ask to a lots of other nodes to sign messages containing the hash of
the previous block, forcing it to reveal any private block. Other nodes in the
network will request the missing block before accepting to sign the message. In
other words, it is not possible to generate a PoI alone. Moreover, if a node is
working on a branch that is smaller than the legitimate chain and ask for the
signature of an honest node, the latter will tell the former to update its local
Blockchain, thus preventing him from wasting resources.
Shared Mining During the PoI, a node will most of the time be waiting for
the signature of another node. So the network delay has the highest impact
on the block creation time. To remove this delay, a set of malicious nodes can
share theirs private keys between each other and try to create a set S where
every nodes are malicious. If one malicious node of the pool succeeds, he can
compute the proof locally without sending any messages. He will generate the
PoI faster than honest nodes and have a high chance to win.
We defined earlier that each node of the network is known. Which mean
that each node is a distinct entity. For this attack to succeed, entities need to
share their private keys. This is a very risky move because once you give your
private key to someone, he can create transactions in your name without your
authorization. This risk alone should discourage honest nodes to do it, even if
they want to maximize their gain.
We can still assume that a small number of malicious nodes do know each
other and collude to perform this attack. We show know that this attack is
hard to perform. S only depends on the previous block and on the identity of
the initiator of the proof, so the nodes have no control over it. S consists of nS
nodes randomly selected among the network. So if there are F malicious friends
on the network, there is on average the same fraction (n/F ) of malicious friends
in S as in N . However, the probability for the tour to contains only his friend
is very low. Indeed, with F malicious friends on the network, the probability
that the entire tour consists of malicious friends is (n/F )mean(D) in average.
When a malicious node initiates a PoI for a given message, it can see whether
the tour contains an honest node or not, so he might be tempted to change the
content (by reordering the transaction or inserting dummy transactions) of its
block until the tour contains only his malicious friends. However, if there is a
fraction (n/F ) = 0.1 of malicious friends in the network (hence in S), and if
mean(D) = 100, for instance, then the probability that a given tour contains
only malicious friends is 10−100. To find a tour with only malicious friends, an
initiator would have to try in average 10100 different block content, which is not
feasible in practice.
5 Conclusion and Possible Extensions
We have presented an new puzzle mechanism that requires negligible work from
all the participants. It requires participants to gather sequentially a list of signa-
tures from a subset of the network, forcing them to wait for the response of each
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visited node. This mechanism can be easily integrated into a Blockchain proto-
col, by replacing the energy inefficient Proof-of-work. The resulting Blockchain
protocol is efficient and more secure than the Bitcoin protocol as it is not sub-
ject to selfish-mining. Also, it does not have the security issues found in usual
PoW replacements such as Proof-of-stack or Proof-of-elapsed time. However, it
currently works only in networks where participants are known in advance. The
design of our Blockchain protocol makes it easy to propose a possible extension
to remove this assumption.
The easiest way to allow anyone to be able to create blocks, is to select
as participants, the n nodes that locked the highest amount of money. This
technique is similar to several existing blockchain based on protocols that work
only with known participants (such as Tendermint [11] using an extension of
PBFT [4]) or where the nodes producing blocks are reduced for performance
reasons (such as EOS [9] where 21 producer nodes are elected by votes from
stakehodlers). We believe a vote mechanism from stakeholders can elect the set
of participants executing our protocol. The main advantage with our solution
is that the number of participants can be very high, especially compared to
previously mentionned protocols.
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Algorithm generatePoI: Program executed by u0 to generate the PoI
Input: d, the dependency (hash of last block of the blockchain)
m, the message (root of the merkle tree of the new block)
D, difficulty of the PoI
N , the set of nodes in the network
Output: P , a list of signatures {s0, s1, s′1, s2, s′2, . . . , sk, s′k}
1 P ← [ ]
2 s0 ← signu0(d)
3 S ← createServices(N, s0)
4 L← tourLength(D, s0)
5 P.append(s0)
6 current hash← H(s0 ·m)
7 for L iterations do
8 next hop← current hash%|S|
9 s← sendSnext hop(current hash, d,m)
10 P.append(s)
11 s← signu0(s)
12 P.append(s)
13 current hash← H(s)
14 return P
15 When Receive (h, d,m) from u do
16 if checkMessage(u, h, d,m) then
17 Reply signu0(h · d ·m)
A Omitted Algorithm
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Algorithm checkPoI: Program executed by anyone to check the validity
of a PoI
Input: P , a proof-of-interaction
u, creator of the proof
d, the dependency (hash of last block of the blockchain)
m, the message (root of the merkle tree of the new block)
D, difficulty of the PoI
N , the set of nodes in the network
Output: whether P is a valid PoI or not
1 if not verifu(P[0],d) then
2 return false
3 S ← createServices(N,P [0]);
4 L← tourLength(D,P [0]);
5 if L ∗ 2 + 1 6= |P | then
6 return false
7 current hash← H(P [0] ·m);
8 for i = 0; i < L; i + + do
9 next hop← current hash%|S|;
10 if not verifSnext hop(P [2 ∗ i + 1], current hash · d ·m) then
11 return false
12 if not verifu(P [2 ∗ i + 2], P [2 ∗ i + 1]) then
13 return false
14 current hash← H(P [2 ∗ i + 2]);
15 return true
Algorithm createServices: create a pseudo-random subset of nodes
Input: N , the set of nodes
h, a seed
Output: S, a subset of nodes
1 RNG.seed(h)
2 S ← shuffled(N,RNG)
3 S ← S.slice(0, nS)
4 return S
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15bytes
32 bytes
32 bytes
32 bytes
Version Time Difficulty Favorite Cheese
Previous block header hash
Merkle root hash
Proof hash
Figure 3: Definition of a Block, for our PoI based Blockchain
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Algorithm checkMessage: Check the message received from node u
Input: u, the sender of the request
h, difficulty of the PoI
d, the dependency (hash of last block of the blockchain)
m, the message (root of the merkle tree of the new block)
Output: whether to accept or not the request
1 if d is the hash of the latest block of one of the longest branches then
2 if Received[(u, d)] exists and is not equal to m then
3 penalties (u)
4 Reply false
5 Received[(u, d)] = m
6 Reply true
7 else
8 if unknown d then
9 Ask block d
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